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Abstract— We address the problem of securing the route 
discovery for Quality-of-Service (QoS)-aware routing in ad hoc 
networks. We provide a specification of secure route discovery 
for QoS-aware routing. We propose a reactive secure routing 
protocol, SRP-QoS, to defend against adversaries manipulating 
link and route metrics and, thus, prevent them from influencing 
the route selection. SRP-QoS ensures the accuracy of the 
discovered route(s) with respect to generalized link and route 
metrics. SRP-QoS is generally applicable, as it does not make 
restrictive assumptions on the network membership and trust, 
and it provides metrics for the constituent links of the discovered 
route(s), allowing the implementation of any route selection 
algorithm. As a result, SRP-QoS can enable QoS-aware routing 
in a wide range of ad hoc network instances. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The routing protocol discovers the network connectivity 
and provides communication paths to the network nodes. A 
route with few hops may be preferable than a longer one, but 
the hop count does not convey, in general, information on the 
‘quality’ of the route. Attributes such as the route’s reliability 
or resistance to failure, or the rate and the delay of data 
transmission achievable along the route, can be crucial in 
making a judicious route selection. For example, a set of 
reliable routes can alleviate frequent communication 
interruptions [1], or paths with sufficiently high bandwidth, 
low delay, or low delay variability can support resource-
constrained applications [2]. QoS-aware routing, that is, 
routing of data according to the paths Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
metrics, can be highly beneficial in supporting a wide range of 
applications in ad hoc networks. 
It is possible though that network nodes deviate from the 
protocol definition and exhibit malicious behavior. The 
challenge is to prevent such nodes, which we term adversaries, 
from misleading other nodes that a path is better than it actually 
is. If successful, an adversary can attract traffic and degrade or 
disable altogether the communication of other nodes. The 
recently proposed secure routing protocols, e.g., [3], [4], [5], 
provide only structural information, that is, route links or 
number of links (hops), on the network connectivity.  
This is exactly the problem we address here. To discover 
accurate link and route metrics, we propose the Secure Routing 
Protocol for QoS-aware routing, SRP-QoS. We clarify that the 
role of SRP-QoS is not to secure the data transmission [6]1, or 
provide for route selection, metric estimation, and traffic 
handling [7], [8], [9]. Rather, SRP-QoS seeks to provide an 
accurate quantitative description of the discovered paths’ 
attributes, and thus enable a variety of schemes that utilize such 
information to configure communication.  
II. NETWORK AND ADVERSARY MODEL 
A network node is a process with a unique identity V, a 
public/private key pair EV, DV, a module implementing the 
networking protocols, such as SRP-QoS, and a module 
providing communication across a wireless network interface, 
e.g., the widely adopted IEEE 802.11 [10]. We are concerned 
with pair-wise communication across multiple wireless links 
between a source S and a destination T. We denote S and T as 
the end nodes, and the nodes that assist the S, T communication 
as intermediate nodes. We assume that each end-node knows 
the identity and the public key of its peer end-node, and that all 
nodes know the identities and the public keys of their 
neighbors. These, as well as the establishment of symmetric 
shared keys by the end nodes or two neighbors, can be 
achieved by protocols such as the Neighbor Lookup Protocol 
(NLP) or mechanisms that are part of the Secure Routing 
Protocol (SRP) [15], [11], [3]. 
We consider two models of active adversaries, independent 
adversaries and arbitrary adversaries [15]. Independent 
adversaries can modify, forge, or replay routing or data 
packets, but ignore received traffic that does not comply with 
the operation of the networking protocols, and thus do not 
generate any message due to the receipt of such traffic. Any 
message that does not follow the expected, protocol-specific 
format or fails one of the protocol checks is deemed as non-
compliant.2 If non-compliant traffic is attributed to 
misbehavior, independence implies that adversaries do not 
process and relay traffic that appears to originate from or have 
                                                           
1 Adversaries can disrupt both phases of communication (route 
discovery, data transmission). In this work, we are concerned with 
attacks that target the route discovery. 
2 We emphasize that traffic is non-compliant if and only if the 
receiving node can detect that a message does not comply with the 
protocol; otherwise, messages that appear to be compliant, but 
actually are not, are processed as compliant. 
been previously relayed by an adversary. In other words, 
independent adversaries do not attempt to assist other 
adversaries mounting an attack, either by ignoring the attack 
and further relaying traffic or by not responding to received 
non-compliant traffic.  
This model of failures allows for a range of malicious 
behaviors and it is more general than crash, omission failures, 
and timing failures [12], [13]. Even though the malicious 
behavior of independent adversaries is constrained, the model 
does not prevent adversaries from simultaneously launching 
their attacks, which may have a compound effect. As it will 
become clear, the model of independent adversaries serves as a 
necessary condition to achieve stronger protocol properties 
than those achieved without the model’s constraint on the 
adversarial behavior. 
In general, adversarial nodes are allowed to deviate from 
the protocol execution in an arbitrary manner [14]. Arbitrary 
adversaries can be more sophisticated and powerful than 
independent adversaries, having, for example, knowledge of 
the identities of other adversaries in the network, devoting 
resources (e.g., route discovery) to establish direct and possibly 
private communication with other adversaries, and exchanging 
traffic and information about their local execution of the 
protocol. 
III. SPECIFICATION OF SECURE ROUTE DISCOVERY FOR 
QOS-AWARE ROUTING 
Let N be the set of network nodes, and E the set of 
unordered pairs of distinct nodes we denote as links.  A route is 
a sequence of nodes Vi∈N, and links ei,i+1=(Vi, Vi+1)∈E, for 
0≤i≤n-1, i.e., route={V0, e0,1, V1, e1,2, V2,…, Vn-1, en-1,n, Vn}. 
Referring to a route as a sequence of nodes Vi implies that for 
any two consecutive nodes of the route (Vi, Vi+1)∈E. We call a 
route with V0≡S and Vn≡T an (S,T)-route. Let ℜ⊆→ MEf :  
be a function that assigns labels, that is, real values 
f(ei,i+1)=mi,i+1∈M, to route edges ei,i+1. Each label mi,i+1, which 
we denote as a link metric, provides a quantitative description 
of the ei,i+1 attribute(s).  
The routing protocol input is a pair of nodes, S and T, and 
the output is an (S,T)-route; we term this as basic routing 
protocol. What we are after here is an augmented routing 
protocol, with S and T as input, and output an (S,T)-route and a 
sequence of link metrics, with one metric for each (S,T)-route 
link. Then, the attributes of the entire route can be 
‘summarized’ by the aggregate value of the link metrics. The 
aggregate value is calculated by a function ℜ→Mg :  we 
denote as the route metric ( )nnmmg ,11,0 ,, −K . The form of g is 
dependent on the protocol, and we consider four different 
forms in Sec. IV. Moreover, we define li,i+1 to be the actual 
metric value for link ei,i+1, and the aggregate ( )nnllg ,11,0 ,, −K  of 
the actual link metrics as the actual route metric.  
Let t1 and t2>t1 be two points in time that define a time 
interval (t1, t2), with time t2 the instance at which the routing 
protocol discovers a route. We are interested in routing 
protocols which ensure three properties for the discovered 
route(s): loop-freedom, freshness, and accuracy. An (S,T)-route 
is loop-free if it has no repetitions of nodes, and it is fresh with 
respect to the (t1, t2) interval if each of the route’s constituent 
links is up at some point in time during the interval (t1, t2). We 
do not discuss further loop-freedom and freshness [15], as they 
are not specific only to the augmented or QoS-aware route 
discovery.  
Accuracy: an (S,T)-route is accurate with respect to a route 
metric g and a constant ∆good>0 if | g(m0,1,…, mn-1,n) – g (l0,1, …, 
ln-1,n) | < ∆good.  
Accuracy provides the assurance that the quantitative 
description of a route reflects its actual attributes. It is 
necessary to prevent adversaries from manipulating the metric 
values, e.g., contributing arbitrary metric values and from 
altering metrics provided by other nodes along the route, and 
thus misleading end-nodes into believing that a discovered 
route is better than it actually is. Route accuracy requires that 
the route metric calculated by the protocol is within ∆good from 
the actual value. ∆good is a constant such that, despite malicious 
or benign faults that lead to inaccurate metric values, the route 
metric is still ‘reasonably’ close to the actual value and 
meaningful for the protocol. The definition allows for some 
protocol- and metric-specific ∆good>0, because, even in a 
benign network, impairments can affect measurements and 
calculations for the metric values. 
IV. SRP-QOS OPERATION 
Metrics are maintained for each link (Vi,Vi+1), with all 
nodes using the same algorithm to calculate or estimate mi,i+1. 
To distinguish the values calculated by each node incident on 
(Vi,Vi+1), we denote the metric calculated by Vi as i iim 1, +  and the 
metric calculated by Vi+1 as 11,
+
+
i
iim . We require that 
1
1,1,
+
++ = i iii ii mm  or ε<− +++ 11,1, i iii ii mm  for some ε>0. If the metric 
in use is some fixed, ‘administrative’ cost agreed upon between 
the two neighbors, then i iim 1, +  must be equal to 
1
1,
+
+
i
iim . 
Otherwise, a protocol-selectable and metric-specific threshold ε 
determines the maximum allowable discrepancy between i iim 1, +  
and 11,
+
+
i
iim . Despite the assumed symmetry of the link, ε allows 
for some inaccuracy due to network impairments that may 
affect measurements necessary for the metric calculation. 
Metrics such as the willingness of the node to relay data, or its 
remaining battery power, can be determined only 
independently at each node and do not fit in the above 
definition. 
The source node (S) determines the metric of interest in 
outgoing request packets, if more than one metrics are 
supported, and initiates a route discovery for a destination node 
(T). S transmits a route request packet (RREQ) that comprises 
S, T, a query identifier Q, an authenticator A=fK(S, T, Q) 
calculated as a function of the RREQ fields and a key K,3 and 
two empty lists, NodeList and MetricList.  
                                                           
3 The function f and the key depend on the cryptographic primitives. 
Similarly to SRP, K can be a symmetric key shared by S and T.  
Each intermediate node Vi invokes the 
PreviouslySeen(RREQ) routine4 to specify if RREQ should be 
processed. If so, Vi extracts the last entry of the NodeList and 
verifies it is the address of its precursor Vi-1. It checks the 
NodeList for duplicate entries and if the number of MetricList 
entries is equal to the number of the NodeList entries. If any 
check fails, RREQ is discarded. Otherwise, Vi appends its own 
address and i iim ,1− . For each RREQ it relays, Vi initializes a 
ForwardList, and adds to the ForwardList each neighbor Vi+1 it 
overhears relaying RREQ with NodeList={NodeList, Vi+1} and 
MetricList={MetricList, 11,
+
+
i
iim }; S updates its own ForwardList 
similarly.  
T performs the same checks as intermediate nodes, and, 
additionally, calculates fK(S, T, Q). If this matches A,  T returns 
a route reply (RREP), comprising S, T, Q, a Route list of the V1, 
V2, …, Vn-1 nodes accumulated in the RREQ NodeList in 
reverse order, the corresponding MetricList entries with T Tnm ,1−  
appended, and an authenticator A′= fK(S, T, Q, Route, 
MetricList). 
Vi verifies that its successor Vi+1 is indeed the node that 
now forwards the RREP, and that Vi+1∈ForwardList unless the 
successor is T. If so, Vi checks whether ε<− i TiTTi mm ,, . In 
general, Vi checks if iSiS mm ,, ′= , where iSm ,′  is the aggregate 
value calculated from the link metric values reported in the 
RREP for links (Vk,Vk+1), k<i. If any of these checks fails, 
RREP is discarded. Otherwise RREP is relayed to the next 
node along the Route list. Once RREP reaches the source, S 
calculates and compares fK(S, T, Q, Route, MetricList) to A′  
and extracts Route and MetricList entries. 
V. SRP-QOS CORRECTNESS 
We consider three forms of the aggregate function g to 
calculate the route metric and show how route accuracy is 
achieved. If ( ) ∑−
=
+
+− =
1
0
1
1,,1
1
1,0 ,,.
k
i
i
ii
k
kk mmmg K , we denote the 
function g as addg  and the constant good∆  as addgood∆ , if ( ) { }11,10,11 1,0  max,,. ++−≤≤− = i iikik kk mmmg K  the function is denoted as 
maxg  and the constant as maxgood∆ , and if ( ) { }11,10,11 1,0  min,,. ++−≤≤− = i iikik kk mmmg K  as  ming  and mingood∆ . For 
011, >++i iim , ( ) ∏−
=
+
+− =
1
0
1
1,,1
1
1,0 ,,.
k
i
i
ii
k
kk mmmg K  can be written as 
( )k kkadd mmg ,111,0 ,, −K , where  ),log( 11,11, ++++ = i iiiii mm  for 10 −≤≤ ki . 
 
                                                           
4 The PreviouslySeen( ) routine can be implemented in different 
ways, trading off robustness for lower routing overhead, ranging 
from relaying a single copy of each query identified by the S, T, Q 
triplet, up to relaying QRED distinct query packets, or even a constant 
number of RREQ copies received per neighbor. Note that the 
implementation can differ at intermediate nodes and the destination.  
Lemma: Routes discovered by SRP-QoS in the presence of 
independent adversaries are accurate, with respect to (i) addg  
and *2 δε kkaddgood +=∆ , (ii) maxg  and *max δε +=∆ kgood , and 
(iii) ming  and *min δε +=∆ kgood , with k the number of route 
links, ε>0 the maximum allowable difference between 
1
1,1,  and 
+
++
i
ii
i
ii mm , and 0
* >δ  the maximum error for a metric 
calculation by a correct node. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The lemma shows that the accuracy of a discovered route 
depends on the worst-case ‘error’ introduced by adversaries, 
and 0* >δ  due to the inaccuracy of the estimation of a link 
metric. The latter factor, captured by the second term of good∆  
in the three cases considered above, is not related to security 
but only the operation of the network. In fact, such inaccuracies 
cannot be eliminated in general. The former factor, captured by 
the first term of good∆ , depends on the protocol parameter ε and 
the length of the discovered route k. The longer the route, the 
more adversaries may be along the route, and thus the higher 
the discrepancy between the actual and the discovered route 
metric due to the compound effect of the adversaries’ 
misbehavior. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The assumption of independent adversaries is a necessary 
condition to achieve accuracy. Without it, SRP-QoS cannot 
ensure route accuracy, and, in fact, if at least two arbitrary 
adversaries M1, M2 are part of a discovered route, then at least 
one link of the route may have never been up during the (t1, t2) 
interval, where t1 is the point in time S transmitted RREQ and t2 
the time of the route discovery. This is possible if M1 and M2 
‘tunnel’ RREQ, RREP packets to each other, so that an (M2, 
M1) link is reported in the (S,T)-route, even though M1 and M2 
are not neighbors. If M1, M2, …, Mk, k≥2, arbitrary adversaries 
form a path, it is possible that any Mi, for i≠1,k, can modify 
RREQ, e.g., adding or removing links and providing arbitrary 
metric values, while all such Mi will later relay the RREP. It 
suffices that any of the M2,…, Mk-1, (in the general case that 
k>2) does not perform the checks required by the protocol and 
simply relays the protocol packets. If Mi were independent, M3 
for example would have ignored any non-compliant RREQ it 
receives from M2, and similarly for the tunneling attack, M2 
(M1) would ignore traffic received from M1 (M2) as non 
compliant. As a result, there may be no actual link metric for a 
(Mi, Mi+1) link, and adversaries can provide any arbitrary value 
for the metrics of such links. 
Finally, a note on related work: [16] proposes a symmetric-
key mechanism for the discovery of an end-to-end resource 
metric, and [17] proposes the collection of link weights 
reflecting prior node (mis)behavior and validation of digital 
signatures at each intermediate node. In comparison, SRP-QoS 
is more general and more efficient, as it provides both general 
link and route metrics and relies on symmetric-key 
cryptographic primitives. Moreover, a generalized treatment of 
different metric types, and formal reasoning on the correctness 
of QoS-aware routing for MANETs was not presented before. 
REFERENCES 
[1] P. Papadimitratos, Z.J. Haas, and E.G. Sirer, “Path Set Selection in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in proceedings of the Third ACM 
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing (MobiHoc 
2002), Lausanne, Switzerland, Jun. 2002 
[2] E. Crawly, R. Nair, B. Rajagopalan, and H. Sandik, “A Framework for 
QoS-based Routing in the Internet,” IETF RFC 2386, Aug. 1998 
[3] P. Papadimitratos and Z.J. Haas, “Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in proceedings of the SCS Communication Networks and 
Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference (CNDS 2002), 
San Antonio, TX, Jan. 27-31, 2002 
[4] Y-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Ariadne: A secure on-demand 
routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” in proceedings of the 8th ACM 
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, Sept. 
2002 
[5] M. G. Zapata and N. Asokan, “Securing Ad hoc Routing Protocols,” in 
proceedings of the ACM WiSe 2002, Atlanta GA, Sept. 2002 
[6] P. Papadimitratos and Z.J. Haas, “Secure Message Transmission in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in proceedings of the ACM WiSe 2003, San 
Diego CA, Sept. 2003 
[7] D. De Couto, D. Aguayo, J. Bicket,  and R. Morris, “A High Throughput 
Path Metric for Multi-Hop Wireless Routing,” in proceedings of the 9th 
MobiCom, San Diego, CA, Sept. 2003.  
[8] G-S. Ahn, A. T. Campbell, A. Veres, and L. Sun, “Supporting Service 
Differentiation for Real-Time and Best Effort Traffic in Stateless 
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (SWAN),” IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing, Sept. 2002 
[9] S-B. Lee, G-S. Ahn, X. Zhang and A. T. Campbell, “INSIGNIA,” 
Internet Draft, draft-ietf-manet-insignia-00.txt, MANET WG, Nov. 1999 
[10] IEEE Std. 802.11, “Wireless LAN Media Access Control (MAC) and 
Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications,” 1999 
[11] P. Papadimitratos and Z.J. Haas, “Secure Link State Routing for Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks,” in proceedings of the IEEE CS Workshop on 
Security and Assurance in Ad hoc Networks, in conjunction with the 
2003 International Symposium on Applications and the Internet, 
Orlando, FL, Jan. 2003 
[12] V. Hadzilacos and J. Y. Halpern, “Message-optimal protocols for 
Byzantine agreement,” Mathematical Systems Theory, 26, pp. 41-102, 
1993 
[13] F. Cristian, H. Aghili, R. Strong, and D. Dolev, “Atomic broadcast: 
From simple message diffusion to Byzantine agreement,” in proceedings 
of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, 
p. 200-206, June 1985. Also, IBM Research Laboratory Technical 
Report RJ5244, Apr. 1989 
[14] M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport, “Reaching agreement in the 
presence of faults,” Journal of the ACM, 27(2):228-234, Apr. 1980 
[15] P. Papadimitratos, “Secure and Fault-tolerant Communication in Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks,” PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 2004 
[16] Y-C. Hu and D. Johnson, “Securing QoS Route Discovery in On-
Demand Routing for Ad Hoc Networks,” in proceedings of SASN’ 04, 
Washington, DC, Oct. 2004 
[17] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru and H. Rubens, “An On-
Demand Secure Routing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Failures,” in 
proceedings of the ACM WiSe 2002, Atlanta GA, Sept. 2002 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma: Let an adversary Vi ∈ (S,T)-route modify one or 
more of the MetricList entries, relaying a RREP with a tampered 
tMetricLis ′ . S will discard such a RREP, because fK(S, T, Q, Route, 
tMetricLis ′ ) ≠ A′ . Next, consider an adversary Vi that tampers with 
one of the 1
1, 
+
+
j
jjm  values in the MetricList, for j<i-1, and relays a 
RREQ with the tampered metric list. The RREQ appears as protocol-
compliant to all nodes that further relay it, as well as T that generates a 
RREP. When RREP arrives back at Vj, 0,, ≠′− iSiS mm , and Vj rejects 
RREP as non-compliant. Moreover, let Vi tamper with one of the 
1
1, 
+
+
j
jjm   in the MetricList, for j≥i, and relay RREQ with a tampered 
metric list. Then, Vi+1 will reject RREQ as non-compliant, because all 
1
1, 
+
+
j
jjm  for j≥i must be void, as they correspond to links not yet 
discovered. If Vi appended one or more additional entries to NodeList, 
RREQ would be discarded by all neighbors of Vi that receiveL(RREQ), 
because the last node in NodeList would not be the neighbor relaying 
RREQ.  
We denote by δi>0 the error of the metric calculation with respect 
to the actual link metric, so that iii
i
ii lm δ±= −− ,1,1  and iiii ii lm δ±= ++ 1,1, . 
From the protocol definition, Vi does not ignore a RREQ as non-
compliant only if Vi+1 appends 11,
+
+
i
iim  such that ε<− +++ 11,1, i iii ii mm . For 
the discovery of an (S,T)-route with k nodes, the above inequality must 
be true for all 10 −≤≤ ki . We consider the worst case, with S and T 
correct, i.e., 
**
0  and δδδδ << k , and all intermediate nodes adversaries 
and arbitrary   iδ . Then, εδδ <±−±=− )( 1
1
1,00
0
1,0
1
1,0
0
1,0 llmm  
*
1 δεδ +<⇒  for the first hop; then, for the 2nd hop, 
*
12122
2
2,11
1
2,1
2
2,1
1
2,1 2)( δεδεδεδδδδ +<+<⇒<−=±−±=− llmm , 
and, in general, 
*δεδ +< ii . Also, *1,11,1 δεδε +<⇒<− −−−− kk kkk kk mm  
and 
*)( δεδ +−< iki . Thus,  { }** )(, min δεδεδ +−+< ikii , and since 
*δ does not depend on k, i, and ε, { } *11 )(, min δεεδ +−< −≤≤ ikikii , 1≤i≤k-1. 
First, if the route metric is calculated by gadd, 
( ) *1
1
,11,0,11,0 ),,(,, δδ ±±= ∑−
=
−−
k
i
ikkkkadd llgmmg KK . The 
sum of δi is bounded since each of its terms is bounded: 
{ }( ) ( )



−+


 −
−+−
=+−< ∑∑ −
=
−
=
.
even   ,)1(1
4
odd   ,)1(5
4)(, min
*
2
*2
1
1
*
1
1 kkk
kkk
iki
k
i
k
i
i δε
δε
δεεδ
Then, we select 
*2 δε kkaddgood +=∆ . Second, if the route metric is gmax, 
( ) { } { }{ } { }


−
+=
≤≤+−≤≤
≤≤+−≤≤−
ikiiiki
ikiiiki
kk l
l
mmg δ
δ
11,10
11,10
,11,0max min max
max max
,,K  and we select 
*max δε +=∆ kgood . Finally, if the route metric is gmin, 
( ) { } { }{ } { }


+
−=
≤≤+−≤≤
≤≤+−≤≤−
ikiiiki
ikiiiki
kk l
l
mmg δ
δ
11,10
11,10
,11,0min min min
max min
,,K ,  and 
*min δε +=∆ kgood .  This completes the proof of the lemma.  
 
